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ABSTRACT: The crisis of political parties in contemporary societies and democracies is composed of differ-
ent points of views, that require a joint effort for social and political science to try to understand the 
changing relationship between citizens and parties. Compared to the political mass models, which are typ-
ical of the second half of the twentieth century, parties undergo deep processes of transformation. The 
beginning of a critical season for the traditional forms of political organization goes back to those years; 
and this critical season can be configured as ideological, organizational and institutional. Between the 
twentieth and twenty-first century, the political parties has strengthened the structure of their political 
organization and the weight of their parliamentary activities within the institutions, becoming more and 
more «state-centered parties», characterized by the progressive reduction of the forms of territorial set-
tlement and the growth of the importance of central organisms and the representatives of the assemblies, 
especially those elected in national parliaments. This results in significant changes of the organizational 
model and their political functions. In the face of these changes, will the parties still remain a key player 
for the functioning of contemporary democracy? We will focus on three fundamental steps: the analysis of 
the creation process of parties and of their function; the description of the most recent perspectives in 
political parties; the analysis of the relationship between the personalisation of politics and the passage to 
leader democracy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the present age of anti-politics and strong criticism addressed at the traditional in-
struments of political participation, our choice to dedicate a monographic issue of an 
international revue to the study of political parties may appear peculiar. 
At the beginning of the third millennium, both in common sense opinions and in sci-
entific reflections, parties are considered to be, at best, auto-referential instruments. 
They are seen as destitute of political legitimacy and operating in a democratic model 
that would be able to overlook the structure of traditional political organizations and 
the ideological dead weights looking back at the twentieth century. However, notwith-
standing limits and malfunctions revealed in the course of time, parties continue to be 
ineradicable within the political equilibrium of all the advanced democracies. To para-
phrase, if it were possible, the words pronounced by Robert Michels to introduce the 
«iron law of oligarchy», we could affirm that, at the beginning of 2000s, who says de-
mocracy, (still) says political parties. It is a matter of fact that, notwithstanding the re-
newed instruments of political deliberation, the close relationship between decision-
making processes and gatekeeper actors, able to aggregate and represent the interests 
of the whole (or parts of) society before the institutions, is still the basic characteristic 
of each political system democratically elected. Parties continue to play an essential 
role in this mechanism. Hence the necessity to continue to devote ample space to the 
study of parties, analysing their historical transformations, their environmental adapta-
tion and unsolved problems, such as, in particular, the renewed forms of political par-
ticipation and inclusion. Starting from these premises, and before introducing the con-
tributions of the single authors, we will focus on three fundamental steps that are es-
sential for anyone who intends to approach the study of parties in contemporary age: 
1) the analysis of the creation process of parties and of their functions, on the basis of 
classical literature; 2) the description of the most recent research directions, with par-
ticular attention to contemporary party models and the related debate; 3) the analysis 
of the relationship between the personalisation of politics and the passage to leader 
democracy, both in the cases where these processes produce the transformation of 
leadership in mainstream parties, and in the cases where the redefinition of political 
representation combines with the rise of anti-politics and populism. 
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2. The perspective of the classics 
 
In modern politological language, parties – from the Latin partire (divide) – far from 
being meant as factions fighting to physically eliminate the adversary representatives 
in the political counter-opposition, are understood as «parts» in a continuous dialectic 
with the «whole» in order to control the power of government. It is from this conflict 
that the first parliamentary institutions have arisen, accompanied by advanced democ-
racy regimes based on the dialectic between the different parts at stake. To analyse the 
party instrument, we will now try to answer three substantial questions: what is the 
purpose of parties? When did they form? What are they? 
 
 
2.1. First question: what is the purpose of parties? 
 
Despite the different typologies and the numerous political nuances, Anthony King 
(1969) attributes six basic functions to parties: 1) integration and mobilization of citi-
zens. Parties not only organise the participation but also try to integrate masses of 
people, with their needs and expressed claims, in the political system; 2) structuring 
the vote. Parties take part in the organisation of electoral campaigns, playing an active 
role in the development of individual political orientations; 3) aggregation of interests. 
Parties are gatekeeper actors, placed between the people and the decision-making in-
stitutions, with the purpose to transform the different claims expressed by civil society 
into alternative political manifestos; 4) recruitment of political leaders and staff. In 
modern political systems, parties have also the task to identify the persons appointed 
to manage power roles, both within the party and within political institutions; 5) organ-
ization of government. This function has a double connotation: it is meant as participa-
tion in the alliance game to define parliamentary and governmental balances, as well 
as practice of the so-called party-government, that is to say the massive employment 
of party people in the available public offices and spaces; 6) influence on policies. Par-
ties have problem solving competences and strong abilities to influence decision-
making process. Of course, in national political systems, democratic and non democrat-
ic, parties do not always (rather, nearly never) play all the listed functions at the same 
time, but perform one or another according to the different historical times and party 
models (Raniolo 2006; 2013). 
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2.2. Second question: when did political parties form? 
 
There are numerous interpretative hypotheses about the origin of parties. Among 
the contemporary mainstream political science scholars, Stein Rokkan (1970) brings 
back the birth of modern parties to four cleavages, observed in correspondence with 
two fundamental revolutions, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. In 
the first case, the centre-periphery cleavage (defence of the centrality of the State 
against the claims of the peripheries) and the State-Church cleavage (strengthening of 
the political independence of the State from the historical privileges of the Church) 
would determine the development of regionalist, liberal and confessional parties. In 
the second case, the city-country cleavage (interests of agricultural landowners versus 
interests of emerging industrial bourgeoisie) and the capital-labour cleavage (owners 
of production means versus proletarians owners of their only labour force) would con-
tribute to found peasant and conservative parties at first, and socialist and left parties 
later. The scene got more complex after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, with the 
consequent birth of the communist party, and, as a reaction, of fascistic parties.  
 
 
2.3. Third question: what are political parties? 
 
To try to answer to this question we will propose an analytical insight based on the 
interpretations of the classical authors who engaged in the study of parties. We will re-
fer, in particular, to the contributions of Ostrogorski and Michels on one side, and of 
Weber and Duverger on the other side. The first two reveal a strong intolerance to-
wards this political instrument, while the second show a greater approval of the in-
strument itself. In the subsequent pages we will present the arguments of the above 
mentioned authors and a reflection of Kirchheimer on the evolution of the most recent 
forms of party organisation.  
In 1903 Moisei Ostrogorski, a liberal Russian émigré born in France at the end of the 
nineteenth century, wrote his main work entitled La démocratie et l’organisation des 
partis politiques. In this volume, the scholar expressed his preoccupation about the 
new forms of political organisation: in his opinion, parties, once transformed in «party 
machines», represented a risk of corruption for the political regimes of his time. The 
importance attributed to the work of Ostrogorski originates from the radical character 
of his thesis and from the originality of his interpretation. According to him, the en-
largement of suffrage occurred in the English society of the mid-nineteenth century 
would give social protagonism to a mass of new voters who were intellectually and 
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morally unprepared for the democratic game. Ostrogorski wrote «If everybody cannot 
speak, everybody can sing» to describe the intellectual impoverishment of the ruling 
class who replaced the cultivated and qualifies notables. To sum up, according to the 
Russian liberal, the birth of the parties is not supported either by the development of a 
political class with free and unconditional opinions towards the masses, or by the 
growth of an intelligent and competent generation able to become a government elite. 
According to the scholar, masses would show a limited capability to comprehend and 
solve collective problems, and parties, physiologically bound to the formation of a wide 
popular consent, would create new forms of participation and communication turning 
out to be simplified if compared to those previously experienced. According to Ostro-
gorski, the development of ritualism and liturgy are the premises to identify those who 
might engage and otherwise would be excluded because of their evident amateurism. 
To sum up, the party would allow the participation of the incapable, offering unintelli-
gible public rewards to those who work with their hands rather than with their brain. 
For his contemporary society Ostrogorski identifies a possible solution in the abolition 
of parties as they are conceived in the political system of late nineteenth century, at-
tributing to them the status of simple groupings of citizens that freely form (and re-
form) according to the problems produced by contingent historical processes.  
Because of this point of view the liberal Russian is considered a sort of father of an-
tipartitism. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Ostrogorski had to 
share this title with Robert Michels, another scholar who distinguishes for being like-
wise critical towards party forms. Born in Germany but Italian by adoption, Michels be-
longs to classical élite theory; he argues that – like Mosca (1896) and Pareto (1916) – 
also in democratic political systems a minority of ruling citizens (the élite) always rules 
on a majority of ruled citizens (the people). The main work of Michels, entitled Zur 
Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie, was written in 1911 and his 
thought is quite simple to sum up. His point of view focuses inside political parties and, 
in particular, inside the German social-democratic to which he initially belonged. Ac-
cording to him, democracy is an unattainable myth as it governed by an oligarchic drive 
that provokes the prevailing of a minority on the majority. The premises of the argu-
ment of the German political scientist are the following: 1) representative democracy is 
founded on parties; 2) there may be democracy in a political system only if the existing 
parties are democratic as well. His conclusions are unamendable: a) democracy in the 
parties is unachievable (and it is unachievable also in SPD, the main German party 
which fights for the attainment of national democracy), as it the body of professional 
officers who seizes the rule of the parties; b) as democracy in the parties is unachieva-
ble, the same democratic principle is consequently unachievable. Hence the so-called 
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«iron law of oligarchy» formulated by Michels, who extends the principle of elitarian 
functioning observed in the parties to all forms of social organisation. According to Mi-
chels, «who says organization, says oligarchy» (ivi, 56-57). In particular, in the parties, 
the bureaucratic structure controlled by officers is made necessary both by the «mass» 
dimension reached by parties at the beginning of the twentieth century, and by the 
complexity of the goals they intend to pursue. All that entails: i) the creation of an ar-
my of political managers, whose acquired know-how makes them essential to rule the 
structure of the party; ii) a distortion of the scopes of the organization, which trans-
forms itself from an instrument to reach a goal into a goal in itself. According to Mi-
chels, in parties and in all social organisations: the organ predominates on the whole 
organism (ivi, 495). 
In the politological debate the negative opinion on political parties was moderated 
by another classical scholar of modern sociology and political science. Max Weber, in 
the first volume of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (1922, 282) defines parties as «associa-
tions, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment. The end to which its ac-
tivity is devoted is to secure power within an organization for its  
leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members. These 
advantages may consist in the realization of certain objective policies or the attainment 
of personal advantages or both».  
The evaluation of Weber is radically different from the opinions of Ostrogorski and 
Michels. Far from representing parties as instruments of corruption or as structures of 
oligarchic control of power, Weber considers them as aimed at pursuing predeter-
mined goals, both «objective», such as a programme for government with materi-
al/ideal goals, and «personal», that is to say aimed at obtaining individual benefits 
(power offices) or collective advantages (promise to ameliorate public life-style). Ac-
cording to Weber, parties fulfill both the indicated functions. Parties may be organisa-
tions of «patronage of offices»: here the ultimate goal is the assignment of the party 
leader to management offices, from where he might appoint trusted persons, namely 
party apparatus officers, to subordinate posts. Alternatively, parties may be based on a 
«Weltanschauung », a vision of the world, and thus aim at achieving political ideals 
shared by all the party members. In theory, according to Weber, parties may be one 
and the other thing at the same time. However, in the society where the scholar really 
lived, parties were characterised also by another aspect, namely the «voluntarism» 
shown by each member when choosing to enroll in the political organization. If one is a 
voter because the right to vote automatically descends from the entitlement of citizen-
ship rights shared by all citizens (Marshall 1950), one decides to become member of a 
party only following an active behaviour and a personal choice. In the argument of the 
F. Raniolo, L. Viviani and M. Damiani, On political parties in contemporary democracies 
 
7 
 
German scholar this distinction is crucial as, in his opinion, the formally free nature of 
volunteer membership influences the two main characters of parties: the partial sepa-
ration between the interest of the representatives and those of the political organisa-
tion tout court, and the cleavage between leaders and members. Weber attributes 
both these boundary lines, internal and external, to the volunteer nature of member-
ship. One is not member of a party thanks to a status lasting vita natural durante, but 
only on the basis of his effective political activism. The party will therefore consolidate 
around a very complex organisation structure, which will then become a bureaucratic 
rational apparatus managed by «professional of politics» who are full-time committed 
to the party.  
The topic of organisation is at the centre of the analysis of Maurice Duverger. The 
French scholar is author of a book published in 1951 and entitled Les partis politiques, 
where he gives a substantial positive opinion about parties and, in particular, about the 
twentieth-century form of party, still undisputed protagonist of European and Western 
democratic political systems even after Second world war. Duverger is representative 
of the so-called “structural perspective” which classifies parties according to a process 
of interior or exterior creation. Parties deriving from an interior creation form within 
parliamentary institutions following regular political elections. Parties deriving from an 
exterior creation form outside the institutions and structure themselves around pre-
existing association networks, cooperatives, trade unions, lobbies, with the goal to rep-
resent the interests of social blocs excluded from mainstream political processes. This 
second typology of political organisations, that Duverger calls «mass parties», is char-
acterised by a centralised bureaucratic structure and by a political organisation which 
would make it especially disciplined and consistent with the objective to be attained. 
Within this party form, the parliamentary group (once elected) would exercise an insti-
tutional role much more important than that recognised to parties deriving from an in-
terior creation. Because of these premises, the analytical model of Duverger has been 
charged with ethnocentrism for it focuses on the evolution steps of only Western polit-
ical systems, failing to include, for example, the single-party regimes in his ideal-typical 
framework. However, despite these criticisms, the reflection of the French scholar pro-
poses an interpretation of parties which deserves a further insight effort. Duverger in-
troduces a distinction between political organisations searching to take limited ad-
vantages within the constituted political systems, and political forms originated outside 
institutional praxis trying to explicitly transform the predetermined rules of the consti-
tuted system. It is within this second category that Duverger positions mass parties, the 
model of political organisation that he considers the most adequate for the modern na-
ture of political regimes founded on democratic representation. In particular, according 
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to him, the structure of mass parties invented by the socialists at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was then imitated by communist and fascistic parties, and in some 
case also by the Christian Democrats, while the conservative and liberal parties were 
not able to change their traditional structure of cadre parties (Duverger 1951). The 
mass party described by Duverger has the goal to permanently regiment as many peo-
ple as possible, to give a political education to the masses and a professional ruling 
class to the party. This mass party is organised in a pyramidal form with a series of 
structures going from the bottom to the top (local sections, provincial and/or regional 
federations, up to the national headquarter); it establishes a set of rules about the 
training of its managers, and identifies specific internal behavioral rules in order to lim-
it the influence of personal power of those who are not at the top level of the struc-
ture. Duverger distinguishes between democratic integrative parties and the totalitari-
an integrative parties. The democratic integrative parties are based on a mainly politi-
cal, though extremely binding, aggregation. The totalitarian parties, on the contrary, 
are characterised by an indoctrination that is not only political but also spiritual: they 
impose the acceptance of a whole vision of the world. According to Duverger, the so-
cialist parties would be restricted while the communist and fascistic parties would be 
totalitarian.  
The French scholar writes his considerations at the beginning of the ’50s, but while 
he sings the praises of mass party, the international politological the reflection on par-
ties takes completely different directions. In his analysis Otto Kirchheimer (1966) de-
scribes precisely the changes occurred in those years, also in Europe, in the traditional 
form of political party. Fifteen years after Duverger, Kirchheimer, a German Jew emi-
grated to Paris and then to the United States during Nazi Fascism, predicts the birth of 
the so-called catch-all party. According to the scholar, mass party represents only a 
stage, historically determined and nearly outdated, of an organisational political devel-
opment: class and confessional parties are transforming into real electoral agencies, 
becoming everyday more similar to US parties. Mass party, as product of the power re-
lationships determined by industrial society, is turning out to be a popular catch-all 
party. Leaving behind the functions of political education, socialisation and integration 
of the masses, the prevailing form of party moves towards an institutional model main-
ly concerned with electoral market, with the goal to widen its electoral constituency 
beyond a predefined classe gardeé to reach the highest number of voters. According to 
Kirchheimer, the success of the catch-all party depends on five related conditions: 
 
1) A drastic reduction of ideological baggage and propaganda focusing on general princi-
ple issues shared by a large share of voters;  
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2) Greater attention to specific stakeholders, associated with a change of the historical 
relationships with side organisation such as associations, trade unions, religious insti-
tutes;  
3) Downgrading of the political weight and role of party members and of their political 
activism; 
4) Strengthening of organisational power of the leaders, to build intense relationships 
with stakeholders, especially aimed at financing the party;  
5) Weakening of the commitment to traditional electoral constituency and of connec-
tions with political sub-cultures, in order to recruit citizens-voters free from single 
class belonging.  
 
A further characteristic of the catch-all party is the progressive professionalisation of 
its structures and organisations. Unlike mass parties, built around an apparatus of bu-
reaucrats, in the catch-all party a fundamental role is performed by external profes-
sionals with specific skills to recruit as many voters as possible. Because of these basic 
features the catch-all party theorised by Kirchheimer anticipates many of the party 
forms that will appear on the international political scenario in the years between the 
second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty first century.  
After this overview on the most traditional party forms and the corresponding inter-
pretative theories, we will now reflect on the renewed political models described by 
the politological literature after Kirchheimer. In particular, we will analyse: the party 
models created after the appearance of the catch-all party and the corresponding or-
ganisational change; the forms of political cartel centred on the appointment of public 
offices with the aim of keeping unchanged the influence on government policies; the 
process of personalisation and focusing on leadership of the different forms of political 
transformation. This last aspect will be examined in depth in the fourth paragraph of 
this article, as it needs to be accurately analysed together with the topics related to po-
litical mediatisation and party’s internal participation in the contemporary age. 
 
 
3. Recent trends and perspectives 
 
From the lesson of the classics we learned that political parties are complex, multi-
dimensional and multi-goal “institutions”. Particularly we can identify four analytical 
dimensions: the organizational dimension (party as proper organization), the structural 
or sociological dimension (party as representative agency), the institutional dimension 
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(party as public agency) and the competitive dimension (party as team leader)1. These 
dimensions have been the starting point for the development of the analysis of parties 
and their change. 
The history of parties varies greatly depending on whether you look to Europe or to 
America and, again, to the nineteenth-century parliamentary regimes or to the (demo-
cratic and authoritarian) mass regimes of XX century. 
The best-known party model, erected as a paradigm of the modern forms of political 
organizations, as we have already seen, is the mass party. However the mass party was 
the expression of the conditions and conflicts typical of the industrial society (Daalder 
1966), but also of the (parallel) rationalization process and organizational gigantism 
that concerned both the State (with the Weberian bureaucratism) and the factory 
(with the taylorism-fordism). The image of parties proposed by the most recent litera-
ture is the most distant from the classical organizational paradigm. Indeed, we could 
say that parties reflect a more general process involving the organizational phenome-
na: the “deconstruction of the instrumental and reified conception of organization and 
its progressive substitution by a more nuanced, anarchic and immaterial conceptualiza-
tion” (Friedberg 1994, 71). This revisionism has then eliminated the different persistent 
prejudices in the party analysis (Panebianco 1982). 
 
 
3.1 Parties as organization and the monistic prejudice 
 
The theme of organization, although it was the central axis of the reflection of clas-
sics, from Weber to Ostrogorsky, from Michels to Duverger, has met with mixed for-
tunes (Panebianco 1982). Still in the early Nineties Katz and Mair (1994, 2) complained 
that “we still known surprisingly little about the organizational development of parties” 
and “ the organizational dimension is today one of the very few remaining gaps in the 
cross-national research on parties” (ivi, 3). In particular, here we will point to three 
lines of development of the analysis : the organizational strength, the types of party 
and the organizational change (Mair 1992). 
The first theme was already central in Duverger - who distinguished the overall 
structure, the members and the leaders (1971, 114-130) - and was later taken up again 
in the work of Kenneth Janda (1980), of Ersson and Lane (1987) and in the contribution 
 
1
 For a similar perspective see: Ware (1995), Luther and Müller-Rommel (2002). A classical differentiation 
is that of Key (1964), who distinguishes between the party in government, the party as organization and 
the party in the electorate. 
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of Panebianco (1982)2. Party organizations are defined by a plurality of internal and ex-
ternal dimensions so that it is possible to say, almost with a slogan, that the organiza-
tion (the organizational model) does not coincide with the structure. This fact raises a 
relevant empirical and theoretical question: do parties tend to become similar from an 
ideological, structural and strategic point of view (isomorphism) or rather is it the vari-
ance of organizational forms that develops through the overlap of old and new types of 
parties? The answer to this question has to do with organizational change.  
Panebianco (2011; 1982) recently reiterated the need to consider the parties’ organ-
izational models in “dynamic” terms, which requires looking, on the one hand, at the 
process of formation and institutionalization of political parties (see Levitsky 1998; 
Randal and Svåsand 2002), and, on the other hand, at the phenomenon of organiza-
tional change (Harmel and Janda 1994; Mair 1997; Appleton and Ward 1997; Harmel 
2006). 
A theoretical perspective that met great success, to the point of becoming almost 
common sense in political science, linking organizational change and refusal of a uni-
tary construction of the party, is that of Katz and Mair (1992; 1994). So it is necessary 
to disaggregate “party organizations at least into three different elements, or faces, 
each of which interacts with the others" (Mair 1994, 4). The first face is that of the par-
ty on the ground, which essentially refers to the membership and the territorial roots; 
the second is that of the party in central office, and deals with the organization of the 
central offices and the internal bureaucracy so important in the traditional mass party; 
the third and last, the party in public office, concerns the relationship between party 
and state institutions. Furthermore, the authors admit the existence of a progressive 
decline of the party on the ground, substituted by the primacy of the party in central 
office and, above all, of the party in public office. 
In this perspective the change (or decline) in one of three dimensions, for example, 
the crisis of the party as an association of members, that is, the party on the ground 
(Ware, 1995; Tan 1997; van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012), does not mean the 
change (or decline) of the party itself. In fact, parties that are minimum in terms of so-
cial roots and number of members are maximum in the rootedness in institutions. 
Hence the trend, already central in Kichheimer, towards the statalization of the parties 
(Katz and Mair 1994, 1995 ). The new cadre parties or professional framework parties 
would fall within this category (Koole 1994; Beyme 1996; Wolinetz 2004). Another way 
to address the point is to look at the "organizational incentives" that supporters and 
voters receive from the party (Clark and Wilson 1961; Ware 1995; Katz 2002). So, the 
 
2
 With reference to the Italian party see: Morlino and Tarchi (2007), particularly the chapters of Raniolo 
and D’Amore, and Bardi, Ignazi e Massari 2007. 
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crisis of parties coincides with the progressive decline of collective incentives (ideologi-
cal and membership) and, conversely, with the expansion of individual or patronage 
ones which are more manageable through the control of the State (for a broader inter-
pretation see also Lawson 1980; Lawson and Merkl 1988; Rommel, Farrell and Ignazi 
2005; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011).  
Anyway, since the parties (the democratic ones) are free associations of volunteers, 
the spread of parties without partisans (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) poses a problem 
of legitimacy not only for themselves but also for the democratic regime. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that in the last decades it has become increasingly diffused - starting 
from the experience of left-libertarian and ecologist parties - the tendency to distribute 
"incentives of process" (Ignazi 2004), that is the expressive benefits more appropriate 
to the situation of thoughtful citizens. 
Harmel and Janda (1994) spoke, with reference to the radical left and ecologist par-
ties, of intra-party democracy seeking. More generally, the development of "delibera-
tive arenas" within the parties (Teorell 1999; Morlino 2006) and their democratization 
affect various spheres. Not only the choice of candidates, but also those of leaders and 
of the policies to be pursued, through referenda and online consultations (Scarrow, 
Webb and Farrell 2002). There remains, however, the fact that the most attention has 
been devoted to the "primary elections" (Pennings and Hazan 2001; Hazan 2006; Val-
bruzzi 2005). In this regard, the comparative research has been moving in two direc-
tions, on the one hand, it has tried to catch the specificity of these particular elections 
(especially in Europe) in terms of definition of candidacy, identification of selectorate 
and degree of decentralization; on the other, it has investigated their function not only 
as a means for effective participation of citizens, but also as a means to strengthen the 
plebiscitary legitimation of leaders3.  
Anyway, the transformation just described, together with others (eg. in the mobiliza-
tion of resources, in the role of the leadership, in the type of communication structures 
etc.), have come to define the formation of new types of party. Among these, perhaps 
the most well-known labels are the professional electoral party (Panebianco 1982), the 
cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995) and the party as franchise system4 (Carty 2004). Like 
the catch-all party defined by Kirchheimer, these models are variants of the electoral 
party characterized by an emphasis on specific organizational or strategic aspects. We 
will return on these types later, but the franchise-system model requires a brief reflec-
tion. This is a decentralized model with large autonomy from national politics and with 
a stratarchic organization (neo-notabiliare), but it shares with the other types the fact 
 
3
 The Italian case received the attention of many researches: Pasquino and Venturino 2014; Pasquino 2014 
4
 In the next section it will be discussed the personal party. 
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that it is "more leadership-oriented and less accountable to ordinary members" 
(Zielonka-Goel 1992, 94 ). 
 
 
3.2 The parties as representative agencies and the sociological prejudice 
 
Parties are not born in a sociological vacuum, they reflect and mediate the "great 
social conflicts" articulated along the functional-economic and territorial-cultural axes 
that have historically shaped Western European societies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 
Rokkan 1999; Ware 1995; Bartolini 2000; Seiller 2003). However, the cleavages theory 
has been often interpreted in a more deterministic way than its fathers intended (Boix 
2007; Cox 1997). Sartori (1969), just two years after the successful work of Lipset and 
Rokkan, proposed instead an "organizational hypothesis” which effectively overturned 
their argument, in the sense that the articulation of conflicts and the salience of divi-
sions were not the outcome solely of structural conditions but also of the intervention 
of political, organizational and institutional factors. 
Recently, Bartolini (2011, 276) pointed out that the concept of cleavage has three 
dimensions: the "interest orientations rooted in social conditions, cultural (ideological) 
orientations rooted in regulations system, and behavioral patterns expressed in organi-
zational membership and action". However, in times of 'light' political parties the or-
ganizational hypothesis seems to lose relevance compared to the "institutional hy-
pothesis". In essence, the process of cleavage politicization involves a sequence of 
phases: from "possible or imaginable parties" to "an actual number of launched par-
ties” then to an even “smaller number of known parties" that have a high probability of 
being voted and, finally, to “seats-winning parties” (Cox 1997). These passages would 
depend also, if not especially, on institutional constraints: electoral rules, party financ-
ing, rules for the selection of the rulers, etc. Another issue, then, is whether leaders 
and parties are actually able to take advantage of these successes. 
Ultimately, socio-cultural (globalization, social, economic, cultural changes, techno-
logical innovations) and institutional factors have joint effects on political change. As 
do the shift from post-war mass parties based on stable cleavage politics to the preva-
lence of issue-based parties labeled as “electoral parties” in the XXI century, as well as 
the resulting change in party strategies from responsiveness to accountability (Pen-
nings and Lane 1998; Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002; Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel 
2014). Indeed the theory of cleavages is not static but implies change (Flanagan and 
Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattemberg 2000; Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001). Of course, 
historically some cleavages, such as state-church and, above all, workers-employers, 
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have left traces on the others and assumed greater salience. The left-right dichotomy 
itself, interconnected with the economical cleavage, although weakened, is still the 
most important political dimension of conflict in Western capitalist democracies (Li-
jphart 1999; Volkens and Klingeman 2002). However, at least since the 70's and all the 
more after 1989 the attention of scholars has been focused on the changing structure 
of cleavages under the following circumstances: (Bartolini 1996): 1) declining relevance 
of traditional cleavages – electoral decline of cleavage-based parties (social class and 
religion) 2) activation of latent cleavages – with the ethno-regional parties; 3) for-
mation of a new dividing line - the rise of green parties or populist parties or even anti-
European parties. 
This involves both dimensions of democratic representation, the territorial and the 
functional one. As concerns the former, one must consider the growing relevance of 
territorial politics, characterized by territorial, or ethno-regionalist parties5 either 
“pure” ones, defending an identity rooted in a territory (Basque Nationalist Party, the 
Scottish National Party, or, in Italy, the Party Sardinian Action and the Tyrol People's 
Party in South Tyrol) or"challenging" ones, which emerge in reaction to traditional poli-
tics and raise issues such as taxes, immigration, security, corruption and so on (Vlaams 
Belang in Belgium, the nationalist Block galiego in Spain or the Northern League in Ita-
ly) - for this distinction see Tronconi 2009; De Winter and Tursan 1998. In the latter 
case, these parties share common elements with the extreme-right parties (Ignazi, 
1994) and, more generally, with populist parties (Mény and Surel 2001; Rooduijn 
2013). Centrality of leadership, appeal to the people, anti-establishment rhetoric are 
traits in common with radical left parties, especially if they are political opponents and 
act as challenger6 (see par. 4). The crisis of representation and the fuzziness of party 
political programs therefore concern primarily mainstream parties pertaining to gov-
ernment area (cartelization), but not the new political forces able to mobilize the re-
sentment and protest of citizens, especially during economic crises. As a result these 
new challengers articulate a new cleavage between the winners and the losers of glob-
alization (Kriesi and al. 2006). This effect overlaps with the existing opposition to Euro-
pean integration and the related emergence of “hard and soft Eurosceptic parties” 
(Taggart 1998; Kopecky and Mudde 2002). 
 
 
 
 
5
 This turn has been associated with the transferring of decision-making powers from national state level 
to the sub-national level, now rapidly growing in Europe. 
6
 It was also introduced the concept of left and right populism. 
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3.3 The parties as public agencies and oligarchic prejudice 
 
The parties are not simply the trait-d’union between civil society and institutions. 
Their leaders are fighting for power, to attain public office and opportunities of patron-
age (powering), but also to find solutions to collective problems (puzzling). Both tasks 
cannot be related to political representation and the transmission of social questions. 
On the other hand, they imply a radical overturning of the approach shifting from a 
bottom-up one, appropriate during the stages of the democratization process, to a top-
down perspective, more suitable to advanced democracies – or authoritarian systems. 
Hence the emergence of specific party configurations such as the «cartel» party (Katz 
and Mair 1995), the «professional» party (von Beyme 1996), the public utility party 
(van Biezen 2004) and, most recently, the «State-centered party» (Ignazi 2004; more 
generally Shefter 1994). In all cases the emphasis is placed on State-parties relation-
ships rather than parties-society ones. It is, however, a relevant transformation that 
reflected the social legitimacy of parties and their relationship with democracy, hence 
the “trilemma between responsiveness, responsibility and accountability” (Mair 2009). 
The idea underlying this debate, however, is not new. Traditionally, with the notable 
exception of the United States (Schattschneider 1942, Rose 1976; Castles and Widel-
man 1986), liberal democracies are strongly associated with party governments, that is, 
political regimes where parties control and influence government institutions and pub-
lic policies. In mainstream literature such control was related to the competition –
between majority and opposition, even if the existence of democracies with limited or 
no competition constituted a clear and puzzling acknowledgment of empirical reality, 
as in the case of so-called "uncommon democracies" (Pempel 1990) and consensual 
democracies (Lijphart 1999; O'Flynn and Russell 2005). However, the concept of "par-
tyness of government" paved the way to some dilemmas: on the one hand, the chain 
of delegation (principal-agent theory) from voters to parties and then government may 
imply the risk to distort action of agents (Müller, Strøm and Bergman 2003), on the 
other hand, building government coalitions is based on the trade-off between policy-
seeking and office seeking (Strøm 1990) and should consider the legacies of the institu-
tions (structure- induced equilibrium). 
On the same token, as Daalder and Rokkan show, research on powering put empha-
sis on the patterns of government alternation (Bartolini 1998; Mair 2006; Pasquino and 
Valbruzzi 2011). In fact, the process of nationalization has been accompanied by the 
fading away of parties excluded permanently from the Government, - with the excep-
tion of extremist niche parties. As this outcome did not occur everywhere with the 
same intensity it is true that the increasingly heterogeneous coalition is a clear trend in 
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the changing party systems of the XXI century. However, it could be argued that the in-
creased alternation in government is caused by the fact that alternative parties hold 
less divisive positions in terms of ideology and policy (Blyth and Katz 2005). 
Anyway, parties are constrained by relations with state institutions, but also may 
find opportunities to get incentives in term of influence (Müller 2002). More exactly, as 
van Biezen (2007) suggests, parties-state interactions should be seen as multifaceted 
with reference to at least three aspects: a) to what extent parties depend on the state 
for free media access and other benefits of state finance; b) parties’ ability to use state 
patronage for pursuit of goals; and then c) the regulation of political parties (if organic 
laws exist). In recent years, there has been a rather increasing attention on public fund-
ing in European representative democracies, growing rapidly from the 60s to become 
the main source of party resources in response to dramatic decline of their enrolled 
memberships (Scarrow 2002). Therefore, the argument is that the party in public office 
plays an important role to the detriment of the party in central office and especially 
over the party on the ground. Such changes may have a prominent effect, then, on the 
various loci of power within the parties. By emphasizing the influence of the state on 
party, this issue is at the heart of the cartel party argument (Katz and Mair 2009). 
However, the cartel party does not imply only government positions to be occupied, 
but also political decisions to be made. This second component of party nationalization 
or party government has opened the long-running debate over whether "political par-
ties matter" (Castles 1982). The role exercised by parties in twenty-first century de-
mocracies appears redundant (Daalder 2002) and unbalanced. It means that political 
parties have seen reduced their capacity to monitor and control policy but they are on-
ly concerned with the their ability to appoint their own. There used to be talk of incon-
sistent party nationalization, in the sense that the inclusion of political parties in public 
institutions could be interpreted as "defense mechanism" (Katz 2006) and strategy for 
survival effective only in managing resources and little or not at all in the control over 
decisions. In other words, parties (mainly American but not only) succeeded in control-
ling two of four power arenas featuring the political and administrative systems, that is 
the distributive and the constitutive, while they failed in management of redistributive 
and regulative policies (Lowi 1972; Calise 2010). It occurred for various reasons: the 
complexity of the problems, bounded rationality, international constraints and the role 
of "non- majoritarian institutions", etc. The argument, though, is that the cartelization 
would not only reduce the representative capacity of democracies, but also their sov-
ereignty and freedom of choice. 
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3.4 The parties as team leader in competition and the electioneering prejudice 
 
In political science the most recent research has finally overcome the teleological 
prejudice arguing that the party’s main goal is not only to win elections (Sartori 1976). 
Instead, parties must be thought of as pursuing diverse goals simultaneously and facing 
difficult trade-offs between goals7. Therefore, parties' goals include vote seeking, office 
seeking, and policy seeking (Newton and van Deth 2010). If on one side this distinction 
has led to a broader definition of the party system and competitive arena (Bardi and 
Mair 2008), on the other, these goals can be pursued by different internal groups (fac-
tions) within the same party. In doing so, following the distinction between ideological 
factions and interest factions (Raniolo 2013) much scholarly attention was focused on 
the stratarchic form of political party and internal factionalism.  
Regardless of whether they are considered a unitary actor or – more realistically – an 
“organised anarchy”, political parties act strategically; this implies they must take into 
account all the constraints deriving from the competition they partake in: it is the di-
lemma between identity and competition, or between bonding and bridging strategies 
(Norris 2004). At the same time, however, they operate in a strongly prestructured 
field, that is the party system. Such a system of stable interactions is also the result of 
path-dependence processes that can be traced back to some salient dimensions of var-
iation. In particular, building on previous contribution notably by Daalder (2002) and 
Ware (1995) we can mention: 1) the degree of penetration (or rootedness) of parties in 
the society (Rose and Munro 2010; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Morlino 1998); 2) the 
level of legitimacy of government and of the democratic regime (Sartori 1976; Linz 
1978; Capoccia 2002) ; 3) the degree of party nationalization; 4 ) the logic of political 
competition based on the number of parties (but also on their weight) and the type of 
mutual relationships (polarization) (Sartori 1976)8. 
With regard to the latter, since the 60s, Sartori’s contribution is recognized to have 
continuing validity as dominant paradigm. The typology, based on the relationship be-
tween the number of relevant parties (format) and degrees of polarization or ideologi-
cal distance (mechanics), not only helps to understand the relationship between the 
party system and the quality of democracy in terms of stability and efficiency of deci-
 
7 It should be mentioned that starting from Anthony Downs and William H. Riker analysis in the 50s and 
60s a rational choice approach emerged arguing that parties are as collective self- interested actors both in 
the electoral competition, as it is said, in the coalition formation and in decision-making processes. See 
Giannetti (2003). 
8 Earlier it was considered a fifth dimension of variation, the configuration of the cleavages in the society, 
interconnected with the relationship between modernization and political development 
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sion-making, but also to detect the change in the format and / or mechanics of the par-
ty system. In fact, Sartori argues that the most important change is the shift from mul-
tipolar (or extreme or polarized) multipartitism to the bipolar systems (two-party sys-
tem or moderate multipartitism). The twenty-first century has led to an overcrowding 
of the moderate pluralism category experiencing what Wolinetz (2002) calls extended 
multipartitism, understood as a system with many parties not in opposition among 
them. Meanwhile there are signs of an opposite trend towards neo-polarization 
(Capoccia 2002) and all other systems, two-party system and predominant party sys-
tems, are a memory of the past. 
 In order to account for these changes and anomalies, a search for new typologies 
has started, which partly follows in Sartori’s footsteps. Generallly speaking, four strate-
gies seem to prevail in the classification of parties at present. A first strategy is rather 
quantitative, and looks at a variety of dimensions such as the fragmentation of party 
systems, the effective number of parties, volatility of vote, polarization and so on: an 
attempt is then made to derive qualitative profiles of party systems from these numer-
ical indexes( Pennings and Lane 1998; Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001; Lane and Ersson 
1996). A second set of works of research aim at shedding light on the intensity and lev-
el of change in the party systems or the regime: thus Smith (1989) has identified four 
different levels of political change: temporary fluctuations, small change, widespread 
change and transformation. In the last two cases there is a real change of regime, as in 
the case of the Fifth Republic in France in the Fifties. A third set of works has focused 
on changes in the logic of competition, from multipolar and centrifugal structures to 
bipolar and centripetal ones. Actually, some such line of interpretation was already im-
plicit in the original typology by Sartori – although indeed party systems have changed 
radically and in unexpected ways (and to unexpected effects) since that typology was 
devised between the Nineteen-Sixties and Seventies: increased moderation of anti-
system parties, and especially of the more ideological ones, has mitigated the competi-
tion, so that the number of parties which gravitate in the sphere of government has 
risen. (Wolinetz 2004). The term bipolar thus comes to indicate not only the mechanics 
of the competition (based on two poles) but also the fact that these poles may be 
composed of more or less heterogeneous groupings of political parties. Which indeed 
creates a very different outcome from the one envisaged by traditional biparty or 
moderate multiparty models. Such bipolar configuration made up of blocs is witnessed 
at present in Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and outside Europe in Israel, among oth-
ers (Mair 2006). 
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Finally, a fourth paradigm directs attention beyond the horizontal dimension of elec-
toral competition9. In this regard, Peter Mair (2006, p. 246 ) suggested to develop and 
integrate the model proposed by Sartori, incorporating novel elements, " to under-
stand to what extent the competition for government is a device for party competi-
tion" and, therefore, how patterns of alternation can change over time (Pasquino and 
Valbruzzi 2011). Following this approach Mair (2006, 67 ) stated that there is a change 
in the party system when " new alternatives of government emerge, and / or when a 
new party or a new coalition of parties gain access to government for the first time". 
Over time patterns of competition for government tend to stabilize, but they can also 
destructure. This is what happened in Italy after 1994, when the executive becomes for 
the first time effectively contestable and vulnerable ( and in fact since then in subse-
quentelections different coalitions alternate in power, albeit with different effects and 
political fortunes). 
 
 
4. Personalization of politics and perspectives on leader democracy 
 
In the literature about political parties, the issue of the relationship between leaders 
and parties, between leaders and voters, and between leaders and governments, has 
for long time been neglected, especially because the attention was mainly focused on 
the organisation of mass parties. The personalisation of politics and the passage from 
party democracy to leader democracy are not unilinear processes, nor are they per-
fectly replicable in different political systems. If the personalisation of politics is a phe-
nomenon common to Western democracies, the major or minor resistance against the 
transformation of political actors, and the transition from an organisation of political 
representation to another, highlight different dynamics. On one hand, where the reac-
tion to the crisis of the traditional socio-political system is the quickest, the leadership 
democracy produces an effect of personalisation of the apical leadership in the main-
stream parties. On the other hand, where the transition struggles to achieve a redefini-
tion of politics, waves of anti-politics, populism and parties which are anti-parties, are 
more likely to arise. As Blondel and Thiebault (Blondel 1987; Blondel, Thiebault 2010) 
observed, the poor attention addressed at leadership has to be attributed to the per-
sistence in the twentieth century of the freezing hypothesis of social cleavages and po-
litical parties formed during the creation of the modern Nation-State (Lipset, Rokkan 
 
9 The studies on comparison between the party system at electoral and parliamentary level (Bardi 2006) 
and so-called "plural party systems" due to territorial cleavages, as the case of Spain (Linz and Montero 
2001) fall into this type of research. 
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1967). According to this interpretative hypothesis, a same system of political and or-
ganisation identities has been “frozen” in European mass democracies at least until 
1989, practically until the end of the twentieth century. Actually, if on one hand studies 
on Presidents have flourished in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Burns 1978; Tucker 1981) 
and in France after the Fifth Republic and De Gaulle (Mabileau 1960), on the other 
hand the phenomenon of leadership in other European democracies was subordinated 
to the relationship between mass integration parties, reference social classes, ideolo-
gies and organisation, except for some cases such as Weber’s studies on leadership and 
charisma (Cavalli 1981; 1987).  
For a long time leadership in the parties was considered simply an element of the 
changing geometry of functions and powers that belong to the different faces, or im-
ages, constituting them (Edersveld 1964). Moreover, due to the mass integration mod-
el prevailing for a large part of the last century, literature mainly analysed the relation-
ship between party organisation and society. Scholars focused on part’s intermediary 
role between institutions and social groups, looking at society on one side and at State 
on the other side, like a “Janus faced” party (Katz, Mair, 1995, 8). It is only with Kirch-
heimer’s catch-all party model (1966) that the figure of leader starts to acquire rele-
vance, following the de-ideologisation process and the necessity to rely on the leader’s 
personality to maximise the party’s attractiveness in the eyes of everyday more unpre-
dictable voters. However, we must not forget the importance of the leadership role in 
social and political change in classical political sociology. In particular, in the studies of 
Bryce, Weber, Ostrogorski, Michels about European countries, and in those about the 
United States where Bryce, Ostrogorski and Weber examined, for different periods, the 
leadership selection process and the evolution of the relationship between President, 
party machine and elective assemblies.  
The same definition of leadership is formulated according to a plurality of perspec-
tives, although a common factor may be its description as a social relationship between 
leader, followers (voters) and context (Nye 2008). In general, according to Bass (1990, 
19-20), leadership stems from an interaction between two or more members of a 
group, where the leader shows his skill to channel or modify the perceptions and ex-
pectations of the group members. It is an interaction which changes the party’s inter-
nal structure of power relationships and refers to many factors, such as the socio-
cultural transformation of the context, the political culture, the institutions and the ra-
tionality of the individual actor, namely the leader. Parties and leaders operate in a 
complex system but do not passively undergo the social and political change, as they 
actively contribute to modify it within a sociological, institutional and competitive op-
portunity structure (Raniolo 2000; 2013). The environment plays an essential role in 
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the shaping of leadership; it is not only an epiphenomenon as the leader “breathes” 
the same air of his social, economic and political environment. Precisely for this reason, 
the party crisis, or, to say it better the legitimacy crisis of mass party in Europe, refers 
to a series of processes, such as socio-economic transformations, change of values and 
political cultures, centrality of political communication, rise of new relevant issues and 
changes of political agenda, role of European integration and reforms of constitutional 
models (Luther, Muller-Rommel 2002, 7-10). One of the most important developments 
of the above mentioned phenomena is the progressive personalisation of politics, as 
one of the outcomes of the general individualisation process affecting the modernisa-
tion of contemporary societies. 
As regards the role of leadership in the transformation of democracies and political 
parties, it is necessary to distinguish between different contexts, as personalisation of 
politics, personalisation of power, and “presidentialisation” are not synonymous of the 
same phenomenon. Personalisation of politics refers to the downgrading of collective 
actors as intermediaries between citizens and institutions in favour of the rise of the 
single individual at the centre of politics (Calise 2010). Personalisation of politics im-
plies on one hand the creation of an individual relationship of trust and identification 
of the single citizen with the single politician, and, on the other hand, the politician’s 
awareness of the necessity to attract consent on his own person, developing his per-
sonal accountability and responsiveness towards his voters, and not towards his party. 
As Manin argues (2010, 243-245), the personalisation of politics is not an unprecedent-
ed phenomenon in contemporary democracies, as also in liberal regimes before the 
mass democracy the political bond was based on the individual relationship between 
notable and voter. At the same time in parties’ democracy the role of the leader is not 
unimportant, as his power can be relevant as much as his qualities; however, the core 
of the system is the internal ruling class described by Duverger (1951), namely the par-
ty bosses and oligarchies outlined by Weber and Michels. In Western democracies, or 
better in Western European democracies of the second after war, leadership takes 
mainly the connotation of “headship”, and, as such, is exerted by neo-corporative 
élites tending towards a consensual and oligopolistic power (Field and Higley 1980; 
Pakulski, Körösényi 2012). In the “audience democracy”, what changes is the centrality 
of the leader with respect to the intermediate apparatus of the party, the relevance of 
his personal and political biography, the selection procedures and the foundation of his 
legitimacy: this latter does not arise from the confidence expressed by meetings, con-
ventions, boards or by whatever bureaucratic body, but rather from the voters. These 
processes are influenced by numerous factors which vary according to the single politi-
cal systems. However, according to Karvonen (2010, 5), they are mainly: the institu-
Partecipazione e conflitto, 8(1) 2015: 01-34, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i1p01 
  
22 
 
tional structure and electoral laws, the role of mass media in electoral campaigns, the 
leader’s political communication, the citizens’ perception of politics as struggle be-
tween leaders, the formation of political opinions and voting choices on the basis of 
the leader’s image, and, last but not least, the leaders’ individual characteristics influ-
encing power relationships in politics and in society. The electoral competition thus 
moves from being party-centred to candidate-centred (Garzia 2011, 698; Rahat, 
Sheafer 2007, 69): the image of the leader is now created through a story-telling which 
selects and especially highlights some of the leader’s more personal and private fea-
tures, rather than his political characteristics. (Swanson, Mancini 1996; Barisione 2006; 
Campus 2006). 
Moreover, the personalisation of politics still plays an important role during the cri-
sis of the representation mechanisms of political systems, following periods of pro-
found and troubled social change. In contexts of crisis, a party and government leader 
is not asked only to exert a role of political direction, he is rather supposed to become 
a symbol, and therefore to gain the citizens’ confidence. The leader has to cope with 
citizens’ insecurity in contemporary risk societies and has to perform a series of tasks, 
mainly five according to the prescriptive scheme elaborated by Ansell, Boin and t’Hart 
(2014, 422-423). The leader has the task to interpret the different aspects of the crisis 
in order to simplify its comprehension, and, at the same, he is asked to cope with the 
“hard calls”, namely the most difficult decision-making choices face to extremely com-
plex problems. In addition to his “interpretation” of the crisis, the leader has the essen-
tial task to describe to citizens and stakeholders the solutions identified and the deci-
sions that he is going to take, redirecting towards the institutions the confidence ex-
pressed by citizens towards his person. In doing this the leader not only must be able 
to maneuver government, or party, policies, but he also has to manage the process 
with the help of experts, media, communication strategies, and all the necessary in-
struments to solve the crisis. At the same time he has to show his capability to trans-
form the crisis in a process of reforms aimed to prevent future situations of trouble.  
The personalisation of politics, and the growing relevance of leaders, are not synon-
ymous of the process of power personalisation (personalisation of apical leadership) or 
of presidentialisation. Already highlighted by Mabileau (1960), the personalisation of 
apical leadership refers to the concentration of decision-making and government pow-
er in the hands of the leader, who is not anymore primus inter pares in collective bod-
ies, such as the board of ministries or the party’s executive boards, but rather he is the 
holder of a superior and autonomous power. It is where the personalisation of the 
leader’s power combines with the institutionalisation of monocratic power that starts, 
indeed, the process of presidentialisation. With this regard, Poguntke and Webb (2005, 
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5) identify the process of presidentialisation with the leader’s acquisition of a govern-
ment power legitimated by the citizens who elected him, rather than by the Parlia-
ment. Moreover, his role as leader of the executive power is not limited by the organi-
sation of his party, nor has he necessarily to be the “formal” leader of it. Presidentiali-
sation can be anatomised in three “faces”, each highlighting the tension between par-
ties and leaders with regard to autonomy, to power resources and to the ability to 
overcome the possible opposition of other political actors. In the analysis proposed by 
Poguntke and Webb (Id., 8-11) these “faces” refer to government institutions, to geog-
raphy of power, and to electoral process. In particular, if the presidentialisation does 
not explicitly request the control of the party machine - as well as, we might add, the 
personalisation of government leadership does not always imply a constitutional re-
formulation – there is no doubt that the personalisation of party apical leadership can 
develop with different features.  
 
 
4.1 Populism and anti-establishment parties 
 
In periods of crisis and transition from a system of political representation to anoth-
er, there may be centrifugal drives within the democratic regime - and therefore forms 
of dissent “about democracy” - or moments of skepticism towards the traditional polit-
ical actors, with the rise of a conflict “in democracy”. In the case of contemporary Eu-
ropean democracies, the spreading of an anti-political feeling refers to a sort of ma-
laise démocratique, a mainly selective refusal of the “present” actors of democracies 
characterized both by disaffection, skepticism and hostility towards politics (Mastro-
paolo 2005), and by an anti-establishment orientation, at all levels. In conjunction with 
this new cleavage between establishment and anti-establishment, a series of new polit-
ical subjects develop, from new radical right parties (Ignazi 2003) and new radical left 
parties (Kitschelt 2000), to anti-political establishment parties (Abedi 2004; Mudde 
2007; Barr 2009). Although radical, these parties are not conditioned by past ideologi-
cal schemes, nor they can be included among the traditional fascist or communist anti-
establishment parties outlined by Sartori (1976); they may rather be connected to the 
opposition against establishment parties expressed by the so called GAL 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian) and TAN (Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) parties 
(Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002). 
One of the recurring events during times of representation crisis is the rise of popu-
lism and populistic parties, creators of the cleavage between citizens, people and 
élites. Populism develops as a symbolical, rhetorical, and cum grano salis ideological 
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investment of a leader who wants to take advantage from the trouble due to the van-
ishing of political references during the passage from democracy of the parties to de-
mocracy of the public. With this regard, Meny and Surel (2001, 29) outlined the main 
arguments of populist discourse, namely: the blame on traditional parties, charged of 
being distant from citizens’ real problems; the gap between electoral promises and ac-
tual government policies; politicians’ incapacity to include several relevant issues in the 
public debate; the absence of mechanisms to enforce emerging unconventional issues; 
dissatisfaction towards government policies; distrust towards the traditional political 
class.  
Sociologists, political scientists and political philosophers repeatedly attempted to 
define the nature of populism, each time encountering the difficulty to trace a definite 
perimeter around a concept which takes many different connotations according to dif-
ferent historical, cultural, and territorial contexts (Berlin 1968; Ionescu, Gellner 1969; 
Canovan 2013; Gherghina, Miscoiu, Soare 2013). Without delving more deeply into the 
different interpretations of populism, or, to say it better, of populisms (Taguieff 2003), 
it is anyhow appropriate to talk about “typologies of populism” (Canovan 2005), just 
because of that “Cinderella complex” mentioned by Isaiah Berlin at the London School 
of Economics Conference on Populism in 1967. On that occasion Berlin used the meta-
phor of “a shoe – the word “populism” – for which somewhere there exists a foot. 
There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these 
nearly fitting feet”: it is thus impossible to circumscribe populism in a shared paradigm. 
Populism has been defined in many different ways: as an ideology, a forma mentis, a 
movement, a syndrome, a social identity (Gherghina, Soare 2013, 3). According to 
Taguieff (2003, 80), it is a political style which shapes a changing symbolic complex and 
takes different connotations according to the single ideology whom it is addendum. 
The possibility, or impossibility, to identify it with an ideology, its many-sided nature, 
its undefined reference to specific social classes, make populism a phenomenon which 
takes its fuel from the representation crisis of traditional parties. Populism as a “trans-
doctrinarian ideology and processual type of ideology” (Șandru 2013, 53) thus becomes 
the reference for various types of anti-political establishment parties, whose program 
is not a structured series of government policies, but rather focuses on the counter-
opposition between the people and the political class, where the latter is blamed for 
representing only its own interests rather than safeguarding and defending citizens 
(Schedler 1996; Abedi 2004). 
Populism does not produce an autonomous party family, but it can play the function 
of ideological addendum to the positions of anti-establishment political parties, mainly 
of the new right, where the leader represents the voice and synthesis of a people seen 
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as community, nation, and heartland (Taggart 2000). Each time the populist leader calls 
on an “imagined community”, a symbolic representation of something that is not his-
torically real, and, in the name of it, he politically orients the citizens’ dissatisfaction 
and need for identitarian security against immigrants, taxes, big corporations, banks, 
trade unions, journalists, intellectuals, judges. Populist leadership tends to take a mani-
cheistic attitude (Zanatta 2013, 25), counter-posing good versus evil, allies versus ene-
mies, “us” versus “you”, nation versus other States, politicians versus non politicians. 
At the same time the populist leader builds a narration about himself as “belonging to 
the people”, a common person, even when he is socially, economically, and culturally 
superior. He thus presents himself as being at the temporary service of a collective 
movement who opposes to the political and bureaucratic oligarchy. Taggart highlights 
that precisely the absence of “a soul” in populism, and the fact that it “lacks universal 
key values” produce its strong connection to a charismatic personality – though Tag-
gart does not give a specific definition for charisma (Taggart 2000). Although most of 
the scholars are inclined to attribute charismatic qualities to populist leaders, this use 
of the concept of charisma is quite far from the “extraordinary quality” that Weber as-
cribes also to plebiscitary leader democracy. Even in this case it seems appropriate to 
avoid the immediate overlapping of charisma and populism, both from a sociological 
and a political psychology perspective (Hermet 2001; Dorna 2004). Charisma identifies 
a leader who opposes to the political establishment, who introduces himself as a 
“symbol” to identify with thanks to his extraordinary qualities, who is able to generate 
a radical transformation in values, as a Great Political Reform at political and institu-
tional level, and who is capable to lead his followers out from an extraordinary crisis. In 
contemporary democracies the charismatic leader is a political manifesto himself: the 
core of his message is not in “denunciation” because “solution” is his testing ground. 
On the contrary the populist leader tends to represent himself as “servant leader” 
(Greenleaf 1977), lacking any innate and superior qualities distinguishing him from his 
followers, but with excellent skills to listen, take care, produce awareness, persuade, 
elaborate concepts, manage, have farsighted perspective and engage for individual de-
velopment and growth of communities (Spears 1998, 6). 
The populist leader is the entrepreneur of dissent, “one among the others” who an-
tagonizes the élite, acting as spokesperson rather than guide, with a manipulation as-
cribable to the same counterfeiting of charisma (Glassman 1975). However, if parties 
with both populist and charismatic leaders may have common traits, there is another 
diverging aspect between them, consisting in the different way of “keeping together” 
heterogeneous social levels and different political cultures. Parties with populist lead-
ers do not have the goal to govern, as the main bound keeping its voters together is 
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the challenge to the system (while internally there may be deep divisions on single pol-
icies), let alone the fact that their access to the government would determine a “nor-
malisation” of the party. On the contrary, for parties with charismatic leaders the gov-
ernment option represents the main test for the extraordinary quality of the leader: 
through the citizens’ electoral examination, he firstly requests their support and sec-
ondly their acknowledgement of the accomplished change of the system and solution 
of the crisis.  
 
4.2 New leaders in old parties 
 
In addition to populist and charismatic leadership, scholars identified another type 
of personalised leadership, developed within the transformation process of main-
stream parties rather than without the party system. In the personalisation process of 
apical leadership, even the parties heir to mass party and formed on the traditional so-
cial cleavages rather than focused on the leader, tend to dismiss the bureaucratic and 
territorial organisation, and to take the nature of electoral committees and “cheer-
leaders” for a successful leader (Pakulski, Körösényi 2012, 19). These transformations 
may develop because of external pressures, such as the changes in the institutional and 
electoral system, and the necessity to cope with the appearance of new political sub-
jects on the political scene, or following internal pressures, such as the challenges to 
the ruling class represented by rival leaders or elites, the demand for a generational 
turnover, and the decline of an organisation model (Panebianco 1982, 446-448). With 
this regard, it is evident that in the passage from party democracy to leader democra-
cy, it is not parties which disappear but, more precisely, the model of mass party (Igna-
zi 2012). The relationship between leader and parties may give birth to partially differ-
ent phenomena, such as the rise of personal parties and notables’ micro-parties, as 
well as the transformation of mainstream parties into parties with personalised leader-
ship (Viviani 2015). As Calise argues (2010, 112-113), the dissolution of the apparatus 
of traditional political organisations favours the rising relevance of networks of person-
al relationships. This process does not concern only the concentration of power in the 
monocratic apex, but also the decline of the party as collective political body on one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the rise of the centrality of the leader’s body, both in his 
private and public dimension, as final sum of identification and trust. The personalisa-
tion of party leadership may be furthermore favoured by specific criteria to select can-
didates, in particular the primary elections, whose introduction may be proposed by 
the party governing board to democratise the organisation, or following a pressure 
from below to protest against the party ruling class (Rahat, Hazan 2010; Cross, Katz 
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2013). Primary elections, especially if “open”, that is to say allowing the participation of 
all voters, furthermore strengthen the personalisation of apex leadership thanks to a 
double legitimacy process (Rahat, Hazan 2001, 313). In leader democracy party leaders 
candidate also for apex monocratic positions, both national and local; they directly 
choose the collaborators for their own staff independently from the bureaucratic party 
organisations, they autonomously raise funds, they dialogue with their electors with-
out the intervention of party intermediate structures, and they use everyday more tra-
ditional media and social networks. The personalised leader tends to be in conflict with 
the party traditional ruling class as he addresses his own accountability and respon-
siveness towards party members and voters, rather than towards internal collective 
bodies. When the party leader is also the government leader, he acquires power not 
only towards the party in central office, ma but also towards the party in public office, 
with the consequent marginalisation of the role of elective bodies. Finally, some of the 
dynamics characterising populist leadership can be observed also in personalised lead-
ers of mainstream parties, so that it is possible to speak of hard populism in the first 
case and of soft populism in the second case. Also soft populism employs manicheistic 
simplifications, such as old versus new, oligarchies versus new political class, lobbies’ 
interests versus people’s interests; however, differently from hard populism, soft 
populism does not locate at the “periphery” of representative democracy, and leaders 
compete for government offices. In conclusion, the processes of personalisation of par-
ty and government leadership represent a challenge for social and political science: 
new theories and new empirical instruments are necessary to comprehend the dynam-
ics of social, political and institutional change, not only focusing on their communica-
tive dimension, but exploring the interaction between new social cleavages and new 
actors of contemporary politics.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Starting from the analysis carried out, after having dealt with the study of the par-
ties, from both standard perspectives to more open questions, we propose a long list 
of contributions which might help to better depict the terms of the problem. In particu-
lar, the research works that we propose in this special issue can be divided into two dif-
ferent analytical categories. Some papers propose sophisticated theoretical considera-
tions, trying to propose new hypotheses of socio-political interpretations regarding the 
transformations of the renewed party models. On the other hand, there are authors 
offering an endeavour in theoretical-methodological comprehension, trying to verify as 
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fieldwork some working hypotheses based on the most recent contemporary litera-
ture. 
Roberto Segatori tackles the thorny issue of the formation and institutionalization of 
contemporary political parties. According to the author Rokkan’s theory of cleavages is 
insufficient to explain the new forms of political organization. In fact, according to 
Segatori, after the economic crisis of 2008, the loss of protection of the social rights of 
citizenship of the new generations of European citizens determined a new fracture be-
tween ‘protected’ (state employees with steady jobs, workers of large and medium-
sized firms protected by the Unions) and the “non-protected” (the unemployed, self-
employed and seasonal labourers). At the beginning of the third millennium, the con-
flict that the parties will have to learn to manage is what divides the citizens into the 
categories of ‘established’ and ‘non-established’.  
Donatella della Porta e Daniela Chironi face the themes of ‘movement-party’ and the 
continuity between movement and political party. The aim is to show the conditioning 
that social movements often exert on political parties also through double militancy 
and the dual membership of individual members. In particular, the authors focus on 
the study of the ‘OccupyPD movement’ as a specific case of interaction between party 
and movement, in this case between the most important centre-left Italian party and 
the largest anti-austerity movement which, starting from the United States, spread in 
Italy and Europe at the beginning of the 2000’s.  
Giovanni Barbieri focuses on a very current subject, the study of Eurosceptic parties. 
The author examines the reasons for the growth of this kind of party, trying to link 
their growth to the economic crisis of the ‘Great recession’. In his work Barbieri tries to 
link the appearance of the Eurosceptic parties to the processes of globalization or de-
nationalization which produce social conflicts between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of 
globalization. The author attempts to verify the health of the Eurosceptic parties in the 
2014 European elections, showing how for an electoral growth there is not a real ex-
plosion in political/institutional terms, since they do not succeed in forming even one 
single autonomous group among the European Parliament benches.  
The work carried out by Donatella Piccio reflects on the endogenous regulations of 
the political parties trying to verify in the field (with a large source of data) whether the 
modality through which the decisional process employed for the approval of national 
laws be a suitable tool to promote a privileged environment for the parties operating 
within it. The aim of the author is to demonstrate how parties, while exerting their 
functions, continue to strengthen their legitimacy in the whole of Europe, guaranteeing 
themselves an institutional survival regardless of their ability to propose themselves as 
a vehicle of political representation.  
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Rossana Sampugnaro address the issue of the dedifferentiation, intended as the 
tendency of contemporary political organizations to designate external agencies or as-
sociations for some essential tasks once carried out by the party (above all electoral ac-
tivism and political communication). In particular the two authors attempt to link the 
subject of dedifferentiation to the analysis of the election campaign in the 2014 Euro-
pean elections. By analysing the main social networks this study shows that the Euro-
pean Social Party’s ‘outside campaign’, although it had different results in each single 
European state, contributes to defining the social base of the PSE. 
Enrico Calossi and Eugenio Pizzimenti concentrate their attention on the existing re-
lations between the parties’ national and subnational levels. Their contribution, in par-
ticular, analyses eight important Italian parties, examining the models of organizational 
change registered after the reforms of the municipal, provincial and regional electoral 
systems. The period of time examined (1991- 2012) goes from the years of administra-
tive reform up to the end of the Second Republic. In their analysis, the authors dedi-
cate their attention to two specific dimensions of analysis: the levels of involvement 
and autonomy of the Regional units of the party. 
Giulia Sandri and Anissa Amjahad tackle the theme of “Party membership and intra-
Party Democracy”, with particular reference to the case in Belgium. In particular the 
two authors treat the matter of crisis in legitimacy affecting most political parties in 
Western Europe. The study concentrates on the organizational consequences found in 
the parties after adopting tools that had been thought up to shorten the distance be-
tween parties and the voters (internal ballots, internal referenda, primary elections). 
Regarding the case of Belgium, the authors try to show that members’ satisfaction with 
the party and their degree of previous internal activism affect the level of involvement 
in intra-party democracy activities. 
Valeria Tarditi takes a look at the European new left proposing a comparison be-
tween the cases of Italy (Sinistra ecologia e libertà), Spain (Izquierda unida) and Greece 
(Syriza). More particularly Tarditi attempts to reason on the connection which exists 
between the capitalist economic model of the main Euro-Mediterranean countries and 
the ability of the parties of the radical left to propose alternative policies to those up-
held by neoliberal capitalism. The article proposes a comparison over time of the dif-
ferent party models with the aim of explaining their greater or lesser capacity in at-
tracting consensus in recent years. 
Marco Damiani and Lorenzo Viviani look further into the new left in Europe. The au-
thors attempt to give a picture of the radical left parties in Europe by analysing the 
process of differentiation that distinguishes them from the ‘reformist’ left. This theo-
retical analysis precedes the attempt to show the main characteristics found in the 
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fieldwork. In this regards the study of the German Die Linke is chosen as a reference 
model to empirically show some of the inclinations attributed to such party models. 
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